After three successive seasons in which the World Drivers Championship was clinched at Suzuka in thrilling style, Sunday's Japanese Grand Prix didn't seem to promise much. True to form, the German shrugged off the disappointing form of the previous two races to put on yet another pole position and lights-to-flag clinic.

After three successive seasons in which the World Drivers Championship was clinched at Suzuka in thrilling style, Sunday's Japanese Grand Prix didn't seem to promise much. Whatever the race result, Ferrari's Michael Schumacher would emerge with the most dominant World Championship since his second triumphant Championship season at Benetton in 1995. True to form, the German shrugged off the disappointing form of the previous two races to put on yet another pole position and lights-to-flag clinic.

Just as he had done earlier in the year at Spa, Schumacher's performance was so fluid, effortless and controlled that it almost went unnoticed, and effectively split the event into two separate races - Schumacher's own personal race, and then the rest of the field. Fortunately, the chasing pack had enough unsettled business to provide some fascinating racing, and to pose many questions that will only be answered in 2002.

Ferrari had arrived at Suzuka hoping that Rubens Barrichello could leapfrog McLaren's David Coulthard into second position, to match the Scuderia's 1979 achievement of a 1-2 in the WDC along with a commanding Constructors' Championship win. Barrichello's task had been made all the more difficult by the uncharacteristic mechanical failure at Indianapolis, as well as the sacrifice of two precious points to team leader Schumacher at Austria. Ultimately, Coulthard's seven-point cushion proved insurmountable, despite the best efforts of Barrichello and master strategist Ross Brawn. Therein lies the race's, and possibly the season's, most telling story.

During the early 80s, Alain Prost proved that the benefits of fresh rubber and lighter fuel load more than compensate for the time lost during a refuelling pitstop. That spelled the end of F1 as a pure sprint event, and turned attention towards the tactical side of motor racing. Prost became the master of tactical acumen, and with the Frenchman's retirement, that mantle was passed on to Michael Schumacher. Or, more specifically, to the partnership of Schumacher and long-serving strategist Ross Brawn.

Schumacher and Brawn forged their partnership during the slicks era, at a time when tyre degradation was the primary factor in dictating race pace. The super-soft slicks, often with a lifespan of only a few flying laps, opened a myriad of tactical options to teams and drivers, and encouraged innovative and daring pitstop strategies. It was a milieu in which Schumacher excelled. Brawn could happily schedule more stops than the opposition, safe in the knowledge that Schumacher's ability to reel off one record lap after another, boosted by frequent stops to replace worn rubber, would win the day.

The trend continued with the advent of grooved tyres, culminating in Schumacher's staggering drive to overcome the McLarens at Hungary 1998. With the recent advances in tyre development, that range of tactical options has been gradually whittled away. Fresh rubber is no longer the Holy Grail of race pace. On the contrary, the Michelin-shod cars invariably go faster on tyres that are fifteen to twenty laps old - a level of wear that would have consigned slick tyres to the scrapheap.

Although it's more obvious on the Michelin runners, the longevity issue applies equally to Bridgestone. At Malaysia 1999, the Ferraris of Irvine and Schumacher maintained race-winning pace on tyres that were literally shredded. At Indianapolis 2000, Schumacher stayed out on a drying track with seemingly unsuitable wet tyres, setting one scorching lap after another in a display that defied the laws of physics and traction between rubber and tarmac.

The conclusion is that fresh rubber no longer gives the same advantage as before, nor does excessive tyre wear impose the same penalty as before. That has narrowed the tactical race options to the point where there is one definitive 'fastest' strategy for each race - and any team that deviates from it stands to lose. During the closing stanza of 2001, Ferrari and Rubens Barrichello were the losers.

At Monza, Indianapolis and Suzuka, Brawn and Barrichello gambled on the extra-stop option without success. Time and again, Barrichello showed fantastic early pace, only to fall out of contention after the first stop. That shouldn't have come as a surprise, as a precedent had been set as long ago as the start of the 2000 season. At Australia 2000, Brawn reverted to the tried and trusted, switching Barrichello to an extra stop in an effort to get him past Heinz-Harald Frentzen's sluggish Jordan. It may have achieved the short-term result of gaining track position, but it also ruined any hope of Barrichello challenging for a debut win later in the race.

One race later at Brazil, Brawn again opted for the extra-stopper in an effort to launch his drivers past pole-sitter Mika Hakkinen. Initially, it looked like a trademark Brawn master-stroke, as first Schumacher and then Barrichello used their lighter fuel loads to pass the Finn. Midway through the race, a different picture emerged. After Schumacher's first pitstop, Hakkinen had regained the lead and, now on a lighter fuel load and lapping faster than the German, had built a lead of more than ten seconds. With each driver having to make one more stop, Schumacher's chances of regaining the lead looked bleak. On that day, Hakkinen's McLaren expired, handing victory to a relieved Ferrari and Schumacher. But the writing was on the wall - gambling on unconventional pitstop strategies had ceased to be a winning proposition.

It would have been tempting for McLaren to copy Brawn in an effort to negate the tactical advantage enjoyed by Ferrari in recent years. Instead, they opted for the exact opposite strategy. While Ferrari use extra-stop strategies to try and force the pace from the front of the field, McLaren have honed their own strategy of sacrificing early pace and allowing the race to come to them during the later stages. This season, that approach has paid handsome dividends for them, and handed unexpected victories to Coulthard at Austria and Hakkinen at Indianapolis.

Suzuka was no different. Barrichello had a higher grid position and an early track position advantage over rival Coulthard, only to see his chances melt away with the time lost on the extra pitstop. It was always unlikely that Barrichello would win the race and snatch second from Coulthard in the WDC. But the dismal failure of the three-stop strategy dropped Barrichello into the minor placings and promoted Coulthard to yet another podium - without the Scot having to pass Barrichello on the track.

It would be churlish to blame Brawn for Barrichello's failure to overhaul Coulthard in the championship race. Unless Barrichello could consistently put the car on the front row of the grid, Schumacher was powerless to help him. As long as there were rival cars between the two Ferraris, team orders could not come into play. So Brawn was forced to gamble, and he no longer has the tools for success at his disposal.

The fresh tyres are no longer a sufficient advantage, and Ferrari are handicapped further by their inability, whether through greater fuel consumption or a smaller fuel tank, to run as long a stint as rivals Williams and McLaren. At many circuits on the calendar, that long first stint is a key factor. The team that stops first is at a huge disadvantage, as their heavy refuelled cars cannot match the pace of their running-on-empty rivals.

Although Ferrari lost races during the 2001 season as a result (Canada, for example), their greater consistency and reliability won through in the end. But Maranello cannot count on continued unreliability and inconsistency from Williams and McLaren. Michael Schumacher and Ross Brawn have always enjoyed tactical superiority over their championship rivals. The brilliant 2001 Ferrari belied the fact that the Schumacher/Brawn tactical advantage has been steadily eroded. If Schumacher and Ferrari wish to continue their winning streak in 2002, it's an issue that Maranello will need to address during the off-season.