Long gone are the days when Michael Schumacher and his technical director Ross Brawn opted for risky three-stop strategies to fight for Grand Prix victories. Last Sunday's Canadian Grand Prix was another example of how conservative the race strategies have become in the last few years. Richard Barnes analyses the past and present trends and how they worked out in favour of Schumacher in Canada

Michael Schumacher's cruise to victory at Sunday's Canadian Grand Prix marked the historic 150-win benchmark for Ferrari. It also demonstrated just how conservative Formula One race strategies have become. There was a time when you could count on Schumacher and master strategist Ross Brawn to snatch improbable victories via lateral thinking, and running a strategy of more pitstops than their rivals.

Hungary 98 was the classic example. Running three pitstops to the McLaren drivers' two, Brawn kept Schumacher informed by radio about how much time the German needed to make up. Schumacher responded with a series of kamikaze near-qualifying laps, and eventually pulled off a sensational victory.

Over time, that sort of daring and unconventional thinking has become the preserve of the desperate rather than the innovative. Brazilian sophomore Ricardo Zonta employed the extra stop to give BAR some much-needed exposure at Monza 2000, but the strategy was never going to prevail over the full race distance. By contrast, David Coulthard's win at Austria 2001 and Ralf Schumacher's victory earlier this season in Malaysia are just the most notable recent examples of the new conservative single-stop success. In both cases, the eventual winner lagged behind the early pacesetters, before taking command later in the race. Ralf Schumacher did it by running one stop to his rivals' two, Coulthard by pitting later than the rest.

Schumacher and Brawn did not pioneer this trend. Instead, it came from their arch-rivals McLaren. Even when the Mercedes engine was in its fledgling and marginally competitive stages during the 1997 season, Coulthard and Mika Hakkinen almost snatched unlikely victories by tanking up to the gunwales at the start and simply running further than everybody else before having to refuel. At the time, Brawn and Schumacher were often content to continue with their 'race fast, pit often' strategies. But, ever since Rubens Barrichello teamed with Schumacher at Ferrari, it's been the Brazilian running the off-the-wall strategies.

It started in his very first race for the Scuderia at Australia 2000, and was apparent in Brazil and Canada this year as well. Each time, Barrichello stormed past Schumacher on a light fuel load, only to relinquish track position later with the extra pit-stop. Ross Brawn clearly has not lost the adventurous approach, he is just applying it with a different driver these days.

It would be tempting to conclude that maturity has dulled Schumacher's sense of adventure, and that he prefers a Prost-like 'slow and steady' approach in 2002. As ever, though, the reasoning is founded on Schumacher's computer-like analysis of race-driving. Or, more to the point, race-winning. And the conservative route simply wins Schumacher more races, particularly in superior cars like the F2001 and F2002.

The turning point probably came at Brazil 2000. Stuck behind the McLarens on the grid, Schumacher and Brawn gambled on the two-stopper, which required Schumacher to pass Hakkinen early and build up enough of a lead to accommodate the extra stop. Schumacher couldn't have raced any better on that day. He outbraked Hakkinen after just one lap, then set off on another of his legendary record-shattering chases. After Schumacher's first scheduled stop, he found himself more than ten seconds behind Hakkinen. Additionally, his refuelled and heavier Ferrari was losing half-a-second per lap to the McLaren as Hakkinen's fuel load burned off. With both drivers needing to make just one more stop, Schumacher's chances of regaining track position looked slender. A McLaren failure ended Hakkinen's race, rendering the outcome moot.

After the race, Ross Brawn insisted that it 'would have been close', but it came across more as hype than honesty. Moreover, in almost every dry and trouble-free Grand Prix since then, Schumacher has run the same strategy as his main rivals. The exceptions were Silverstone and Monza 2001 - and Schumacher lost on both occasions. Not even the German's legendary ability to turn in hotlaps on demand could redeem the wrong strategy. The tyres had changed, Formula One had changed, and Schumacher needed to change too.

With the arrival of the super-durable Michelin tyres - and Bridgestone's response to the Michelin challenge - lap times are now, more than ever, decided by fuel weight rather than tyre wear. For the extra-stopper, lower start-line fuel weight is a significant early advantage. But overall it's not enough, particularly with the current difficulty in overtaking, the vagaries of traffic and the regular appearance of the safety car. Unless the extra-stopper can get into the lead within the first few laps and scamper away on a clear track right up until the crucial first pitstop, the game is over.

Both Barrichello and Juan Pablo Montoya suffered the consequences on Sunday. Barrichello, even pushing as hard as he was, dropped out of the frame the moment the safety car was deployed while marshals removed Jacques Villeneuve's stricken BAR from the circuit. After dropping back into the pack, he never recovered his two-stop pace, and was comfortably overhauled by the single-stopping Coulthard in the far less competitive McLaren.

The decision to run an extra stop for Barrichello gave the Brazilian some limelight in Canada, just as it had at Brazil. Ultimately, though, it isn't doing his Championship tally any favours. It isn't necessary to run the extra stop strategy purely for the sake of early overtaking. David Coulthard proved several times that even a lowly grid position can result in victory, if the driver is on the right strategy and has the patience to let the race come to him. It's not the most exciting form of racing, and rarely results in any on-track overtaking. Instead, the critical passes are made in the pits. Still, it's effective and less risky than counting on a low starting fuel weight and an extra stop.

Montoya made a better showing than Barrichello, although his strategy was less clear. If the Colombian was running a genuine two-stopper, then his early capitulation to Barrichello was disappointing. If he had started on a one-stopper, then his decision to pit early during the safety-car period was purely baffling. Sacrificing track position to third-placed Michael Schumacher, placing himself behind the slower Kimi Raikkonen and teammate Ralf Schumacher, and then battling along on a full fuel load after the stop, made no sense at all.

Montoya's chances were redeemed by the rare double mistake from Raikkonen and Ralf Schumacher, allowing Montoya to pass them both out of the final chicane. That's not the sort of opportunistic moment that can be planned in any race strategy. Without that stroke of good fortune - albeit brilliantly exploited - Montoya would have been stuck behind the two slower cars until they pitted - easily long enough for Schumacher to build a race-winning lead.

Montoya's pace immediately before his retirement suggested that he would have run Schumacher very close over the closing laps, had his engine lasted the distance. But, especially in an era of limited overtaking opportunities, the purpose of strategy is to give a driver the benefit of track position - to get him out ahead of his rivals after the final stop, not behind them. Montoya started the race ahead of Schumacher, and ended up behind him after both had made their final stops. If that is the Colombian's idea of a perfect strategy, then he needs to cast his mind back one year to Ralf Schumacher's win at this same circuit in 2001. If ever a race illustrated the late single-stop strategy to perfection, it was Ralf's triumph over his brother in that race.

As ever, Michael Schumacher made it look easy on Sunday, even though keeping in contact with the lighter leading cars during the early laps took every ounce of his fierce concentration and racecraft. And, as ever, Barrichello bemoaned cruel fate for his downfall. Cynics will suggest that it's just more evidence of Schumacher's outrageously good luck, and certainly the safety car was deployed at just the right time for the German. However, the safety car had been deployed at five of the previous six Canadian Grands Prix; predicting that it would happen again - and planning accordingly - hardly qualifies as 'good luck' on Schumacher's part.

Ferrari are in the cushy position of being able to hedge their bets, running Schumacher on the conventional strategy and playing Barrichello as a wild card. Schumacher doesn't need victories to sew up this year's Championship - a string of minor points placings will see him home comfortably. And, on the odd occasion where conditions mitigate against conventional strategies, Barrichello will be in a position to capitalise.

It's not likely to happen often. Mika Hakkinen was the last driver to win a Grand Prix with the extra-stop strategy, when he beat Schumacher at Silverstone last year. But it does partly explain why Ferrari have racked up a streak of 44 consecutive podium finishes. The last non-podium Grand Prix finish for the Scuderia was the infamous Eddie Irvine three-wheeler pitstop debacle at Nurburgring in 1999. History could repeat itself when the F1 circus arrives back at Nurburgring in two weeks time, but no one is likely to be holding their breath in anticipation.