The Weekly Grapevine
By Tom Keeble, England
Atlas F1 Columnist
One thing that has been especially noticeable to visitors to the Milton Keynes factory over the years, is the way attitudes have changed, normally showing a direct reflection not only of the way the team is performing, but the manner of administration, and the faith that the engineers have in it.
Back when Stewart Racing was formed, the factory had much the same attitude that is associated with Minardi today. Under the auspices of Jackie Stewart, a solid budget had been found, along with a decent engine deal that offered a real opportunity to put the cat amongst the pigeons. Stewart's five-year plan was not original - all the teams have a similar plan for their 'roadmap to the front' - but it was more than just rhetoric for the sponsors. The people putting in the hours on the design and implementation of the race cars were doing what they wanted to be doing. Stewart and his son were a presence at the factory, and always seen to be improving things for the team. Despite a shortage of personnel and very tight budgets, there was a hugely positive attitude, and the air of potential. Even bad weekends, of which there were a few, especially in the team's second year, seemed only to provide new spurs to improve the car.
When Ford bought Stewart, a lot of things changed, if not overnight. The Jaguar branding brought with it a number of things that were not entirely positive. The huge cash injection that it represented was good news for hiring personnel to improve the leadership, bringing Bobby Rahal and Niki Lauda on board, bolster the design and engineering staff, and hire drivers like Eddie Irvine to help develop the car and drive the team on.
Unfortunately, it also brought out a seriously political streak that ran right through the team, as different factions fought increasingly hard for control. The lack of results on track did nothing to help, instead fostering a blame culture in an environment where, previously, mistakes had been handled with a solutions oriented approach.
It could be argued that both aspects were inevitable: instead of being what amounted to a small, family run team, since the whole enterprise had been swallowed whole by the Ford Motor Company, it was part of a large, multinational conglomerate, and expected to function like any other commercial unit within the structure. The Ford board expected a return on their investments: the considerable expense of purchasing the team, then building the Jaguar brand in to it was expected to yield tangible sales. The purchase had taken place on the promise of results, based on the fact that Stewart was a going places concern, and it should only perform better with the increased backing that Ford brought.
In the three years since the team became Jaguar Racing, the whole structure has been changed. Ford ownership brought with it some of the established Ford management structures and dogma - and restrictions, which proved a considerable distraction. For example, fighting the dictum that only Ford's established computer supplier, Dell, could be used, when the team had a technical partnership with HP, who offered free equipment and expertise. The immediate impact of the revised management was disruption throughout the infrastructure, turning the team from a responsive, cohesive whole, into a bureaucratic nightmare. It was not the best environment for designing cars, and so little surprise that the team was not performing on track.
When Rahal was talked in to joining the team, he soon uncovered the biggest issues, and set about resolving the management problems within the team. As usual, restructuring management did not make many friends - at least, not within the management. Lauda was introduced around the same time, as part of a political move within the senior Ford management, revealing the height to which the political machinations ascended. Little surprise that, on the shop floor, there was low motivation: backing the wrong horse would clearly result in trouble down the road, and it really didn't help that the drivers were all to often being heard being negative about the cars both in private and public settings.
The very public failure to bring Adrian Newey over from McLaren reflected badly on Rahal, giving Lauda the final piece of ammunition required to oust the American. Losing Rahal before he had even completed a season left the team unsettled and low on moral: the politics with two leaders may have been awkward, but Rahal at least provided a strong direction. Lauda, in contrast, came across within the team - and to the board - as having plenty of ambition for the team, but no idea how to realise it. To those watching, it seemed that there were lots of excuses and scapegoats, but no expectation of improvements in the short term. Firing both experienced drivers to hire rookies seemed like just another example of throwing the baby out with the bath water.
It is ironic, then, that it was this environment that saw the foundations of this season laid down.
Since Lauda's well publicised departure at the end of last season, the atmosphere within the team has finally settled: for the first time in three years, it can genuinely be called positive. A lot of this is due to the new structure at the top. Tony Purnell, founder of Pi Research, is a technically astute man, who built a successful company from scratch. David Pitchforth is a widely experienced and respected technical director, and Ben Agathangelou is a competent aerodynamicist. Nick Hayes, as director of engineering at Cosworth, has produced some very solid engines since the Stewart project began. Vitally, all are not only committed to the team, but they give the appearance of having the team's progress ahead of any personal ambitions - and so far, are working well together. This change at the top appears to be a breeding ground for stability.
That said, by far the biggest ingredient has been the success of the new car on the track - Mark Webber's pace in particular has brought home the fact that the team is making real progress, and finally looking competitive. And that is, after all, the most obvious missing ingredient.
Having finally brought their new car out to test, the competition has been casting a very careful eye over it, in order to work out both what might have delayed its introduction so long, and what, exactly, they would be facing for the second half of the season.
The MP4-18 has got off to a bit of a mixed start. Despite protestations that its initial outing was intended only to complete installation checks, given its long gestation, it has been apparent to those watching that things have not been going as smoothly as most observers expected, leading some to question whether the car might prove itself unreliable. McLaren have been all too keen to dismiss the early problems as minor, but their propensity for misinformation is well documented, and few are buying it: even if the car was only intended to be run in, the team was clearly disappointed about something from its running.
On being launched, plenty was made of how McLaren perceived the new Ferrari as an evolution on its predecessor, whilst their latest car was a complete redesign, with substantial effort going in to optimising the packaging. Clearly, judging by the narrower, lower cross-section of the engine cover, there have been changes inside, but there are some questions over what these are: optimising the packaging should not have taken six months.
The engine is a new unit, which occupies more convenient dimensions for optimising the aerodynamics. The centre of gravity is lower, and this appears to have been achieved without widening the angle of the engine beyond the 90 degree V of its predecessor. More importantly, the unit develops plenty of horsepower, reputedly as much as its predecessor, and has the potential to be developed further.
However, both Williams and Ferrari have been asking why this car has taken so long to develop, and how it benefits McLaren to miss half the season: the MP4-17D might well have made a good start to the season, but it represents the end of a development cycle. Success against the Ferrari and Williams 2003 cars would have to come from building a better vehicle, not working on the old model: McLaren would not be gambling on a poor showing from both teams.
Neither team is sure precisely where McLaren's advantage will be with the new car yet, except that they have had long enough since the rules were changed at the start of the year to change the design of the car, to do something with the rules. But they have not really worked out what that might be, unless it is to reduce the requirements for the fuel tank: filling up to the brim is rare under the new regulations, which are seeing cars stop more often than in previous seasons. Then again, that would be inconsistent with the tactics McLaren have been running so far, as they have shown a tendency to go for the option with fewest stops when there has been a choice.
Mind you, despite the relatively slow start, McLaren still seem to have high expectations for the car. They clearly believe the reliability issues will be resolved in short order and that the car has potential: certainly, neither Williams nor Ferrari are writing it off, and both are anticipating the MP4-18 makes an interesting debut at the Nurburgring.
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