Just as in warfare, the smaller of two opponents must out think and out maneuver their larger foe if they wish to win, no less survive. When a Formula One team combines quick thinking and speed with largesse, the rest of the field might as well pack it up and try a different career. Of course, the will to succeed drives the remainder of the field towards winning, and the reason why they're in F1 in the first place. But far more important than the size of team budgets and employee levels is the thinking aspect of F1. It is the thinking that goes into chassis, engine, transmission, and electronics design. And, it is the thinking that goes into race preparation and race performance. Some may resign themselves with boredom towards F1, but a large part of that is because the important action takes place out of sight.

Like Ayrton Senna, Michael Schumacher is a brilliant race tactician; the oft ignored and very much honed skill that makes champions out of relatively equal drivers, performance wise. Like Schumacher, the late great Senna had an uncanny ability to predict the weather and outguess drivers and seize victory. In truth, Senna was no better at weather forecasting than David Letterman. But what he, like Schumacher today, was finely adept at was knowing where he stood in comparison to the field, make that vice versa. There's no roll of the dice or gamble involved, but thinking and lots of it.

Schumacher is not just a two-time world champion because he is consistently quick. His lengthy score of race wins, and in general, optimal finishing positions, or pulling off 2nd place finishes, instead of 3rd or 4th, are largely determined by making the correct choices beforehand regarding race tactics. Such as which setup configuration will prove quickest and most reliable, how much fuel to start the race, frequency of pit stops, and adapting to changing track and weather conditions, and patience. With the exception of actual driving, Schumacher's performance is largely decided before the race itself begins. No different in principle than the rest, he just prepares better. Add to this his mental attitude that is perfect for car racing or achieving the best possible outcome with the machinery at hand, day in and day out.

These are some of the pre-race tactics, or series of choices based on sizing up the opposition and measuring the pros and cons of ones own race car. The hidden and decisive variables not apparent to the viewer and ideally to all other teams in the pit lane. Despite what others may think when the five red lights go out there is little a driver or team can do to improve their performance, besides alterations in fuel levels, tire pressure, and removing the wicker rod on top of the rear wing. A driver can only do as well as their car permits. So the first emphasis is on getting the car right before the race begins. The race itself is a different story.

When it comes down to race strategy Formula One teams are not entirely the real masters of their own destiny on Sunday afternoon. It might seem odd but their good fortune or bad luck usually rests in the hands of the competition. Or, what the competition does or fails to do. A tactical error by one team becomes a strategic benefit to those who identify and seize the opportunity. In this sense race strategy doesn't exist besides the hypothetical "what if?" scenarios pondered by teams for hours on end in the motor home. By that, it means no team can possibly predict which cars and the weather will do what, where, and when, so it's really a matter of patiently sitting back and watching how the race unfolds in the hopes of spotting a slim advantage when and if it appears. I call it waiting for the opposition to shoot themselves in the foot. And traditionally, the one team most proficient in this moribund talent of past note has been Williams; and the one driver most able to spot and capitalize on those gaffes has been Schumacher.

Tactics:

Scenario 1.

(The car in front has a thirty second lead and it starts to rain). You'll remember this, Damon Hill was comfortably leading Spa in 1995 ahead of Michael Schumacher and it began to rain. What do you do? Does the lead car hold the advantage? Not at all. Despite the fact that Damon was three time zones ahead of Schumacher and seemingly heading towards an assured victory in the most superior car, the Williams team were in the midst of a peculiar disadvantage. Schumacher, three time zones in arrears, was controlling the race for the next thirty seconds. The outcome for Williams depended on Schumacher's next move before he crossed the start finish line:  If he came in for rain tires or stayed out. A game of waiting or high speed chess.

The Outcome:

Williams shot themselves in the foot. They flinched when they should have waited until Schumacher made his move, to come in or stay out, and then when handed the choice (the advantage) matched whatever Benetton did. To the unexpected glee of Benetton, the Williams team ignored the advantage, took their eyes off Schumacher, and brought Damon in for rain tires. The worst choice to make. Because Schumacher, of course, stayed out. Had Williams kept Damon out they would've had a thirty second buffer zone to judge the relative speed of their car in comparison to Schumacher. And chances are the 30 second lead margin would've remained steady. Schumacher, on slicks, caught Damon on wets and passed for the lead and took the victory.

Scenario 2.

(A downpour in Barcelona '96 at the starting grid) What do you do? Naturally, you do what Schumacher does: go with a full wet setup. Why? The difference between a full wet setup and a medium setup in a torrential downpour is 5-6 seconds per lap in favour of the full wet. The difference between these setups in the dry is 2-3 seconds in favour of the medium. Do the math. Even if the track starts to dry out ten laps into the race, the medium setup will be fifty seconds behind. It takes about ten laps for the track to dry and all the while the wet setup is increasing their lead.

Outcome:

In this case the rain never let up and Schumacher destroyed the field, based on a tactical decision beforehand that determined the outcome of the race. Schumacher's on average 5 second per lap edge over the field was not due to simply driving skill. It was due to tactical prowess. Or thinking, as he applied in equal fashion at Monaco '97.